Published Essays
LOL: What we can learn from forced laughter
2021: In Brian Robinson (ed.), Moral Psychology of Amusement, Rowan and Littlefield
Research on laughter tends to focus on spontaneous amusement. However, we often laugh when we are not amused at all. I draw on my enactive theory of emotion to draw lessons about the social role of humor, and emotions in general.
2021: In Brian Robinson (ed.), Moral Psychology of Amusement, Rowan and Littlefield
Research on laughter tends to focus on spontaneous amusement. However, we often laugh when we are not amused at all. I draw on my enactive theory of emotion to draw lessons about the social role of humor, and emotions in general.
An enactivist theory of emotional content (with Jesse Prinz)
2018: In Hichem Naar and Fabrice Teroni (Eds.) The Ontology of Emotion, Cambridge University Press
We argue that emotions are enactive rather than representational states. Emotions temporarily modify affordances through episodic physiological and motivation changes. These physiological and motivational changes are integrated with social displays, allowing emotions to also modify social affordances.
2018: In Hichem Naar and Fabrice Teroni (Eds.) The Ontology of Emotion, Cambridge University Press
We argue that emotions are enactive rather than representational states. Emotions temporarily modify affordances through episodic physiological and motivation changes. These physiological and motivational changes are integrated with social displays, allowing emotions to also modify social affordances.
Appraisals, emotions, and inherited emotional objects
2017: Emotion Review
In an essay on the legacy of Stanley Schachter, I argue that modern appraisal theories are not justified in assuming that emotions inherit the intentional objects of the appraisals that elicit them. I argue instead for a view of emotional episodes as homeostatic property clusters, with only generic appraisals belonging to the cluster.
2017: Emotion Review
In an essay on the legacy of Stanley Schachter, I argue that modern appraisal theories are not justified in assuming that emotions inherit the intentional objects of the appraisals that elicit them. I argue instead for a view of emotional episodes as homeostatic property clusters, with only generic appraisals belonging to the cluster.
The insignificance of empty higher-order thoughts
2016: Journal for Cognition and Neuroethics
The possibility of empty higher-order thoughts (HOTs) is the basis of one of the most common arguments against higher-order theories of consciousness. Ironically, Lycan appealed to empty HOTs in his defense of higher-order theories against Kripke's modal argument. I argue that both uses of empty HOTs ultimately fail.
2016: Journal for Cognition and Neuroethics
The possibility of empty higher-order thoughts (HOTs) is the basis of one of the most common arguments against higher-order theories of consciousness. Ironically, Lycan appealed to empty HOTs in his defense of higher-order theories against Kripke's modal argument. I argue that both uses of empty HOTs ultimately fail.
Emotions without Objects
2015: Biology and Philosophy
I argue on the basis of social psychology research that emotions lack intentional objects, and consider a number of objections.
2015: Biology and Philosophy
I argue on the basis of social psychology research that emotions lack intentional objects, and consider a number of objections.
In Progress
Fitting emotion into a reinforcement learning theory of moral judgment
Recently a number of theorists have revised dual-process accounts of moral psychology, replacing the emotion-reason dichotomy with the distinction between model-free and model-based learning drawn from reinforcement learning theory. I develop an account of how emotions should fit into this new class of theories.
Recently a number of theorists have revised dual-process accounts of moral psychology, replacing the emotion-reason dichotomy with the distinction between model-free and model-based learning drawn from reinforcement learning theory. I develop an account of how emotions should fit into this new class of theories.
Reviews
Review of Emotion, imagination, and the limits of reason by Talia Morag
2018: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
2018: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Review of John Deigh (Ed.), On Emotions: Philosophical Essays (with Jesse Prinz)
2013: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
2013: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews